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Recent Decisions
ANTITRUST-MERGER-DIvETITURE ACTION-The Supreme Court
of the United States has held that the failing company doctrine can-
not successfully be invoked as a defense to an anti-merger action
unless defendant establishes both that the acquiring company is the
only available purchaser and that there is dim or non-existent hope
for reorganization of the failing company through bankruptcy pro-
cedures.
Citizen Publishing Company v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 927 (1969).
Two daily newspapers, the Citizen and the Star, are published in
Tucson, Arizona. Prior to 1940 each was wholly independent; there
was vigorous competition between them; they had entered into no
agreements or accommodations which would cushion the effects of that
competition upon them. In 1940, while the two papers enjoyed al-
most equal circulation, the Citizen found itself to be suffering aver-
age annual losses of about $24,000 while the Star's average annual
profit approximated $26,000. In that year a joint operating agreement
was concluded between the competitors whereby Tucson Newspapers,
Inc., wholly owned by the stockholders of the Citizen and the Star,
was formed to manage all the business of both papers; only their news
and editorial departments retained independence. In addition to this
joint operating agreement, a Stock Agreement was entered into by the
terms of which the stockholders of each newspaper were given the op-
tion to purchase should the stockholders of the other desire to sell.'
In 1964 the owners of the Star decided to sell their newspaper and
received an offer to buy from Brush-Moore Newspapers, Inc.2 Stock-
holders of the Citizen prevented sale of the Star to Brush-Moore by
exercising their option under the Stock Agreement, becoming them-
selves owners of the Star.3 Citizen stockholders formed Arden Publish-
ing Company as the vehicle for acquisition of the Star stock, and Arden
was publisher of that paper at the time of the instant litigation. The
Department of Justice brought suit under sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act 4 and under section 7 of the Clayton Act 5 seeking mod-
1. United States v. Citizen Publishing Company, 280 F. Supp. 978 (D. Arizona 1968).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1890).
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ification of the joint operating agreement and divestiture of Star stock
by the stockholders of the Citizen.
The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Douglas speaking for the Court,
affirmed the order of the lower court requiring modification of the
joint operating agreement and divestiture of the Star and its reestab-
lishment as an independent entity. The judgment of the District
Court that the joint operating agreement constituted a per se viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act 6 was affirmed with minimal com-
ment by the Supreme Court. The remainder of the high Court's brief
opinion was taken up in consideration of the so called "failing com-
pany" defense to the alleged violations of section 2 of the Sherman
Act 7 and of section 7 of the Clayton Act.8 In concluding that the
failing company defense was not applicable, the Court focused its at-
tention on two heretofore unsettled propositions, 9 that the defense
does not apply, "unless it is established that the company that ac-
quires it . . . is the only available purchaser"'1 and that the defense
does not become available until it is made to appear that the pros-
pect for reorganization of the putative failing company either through
receivership or through Chapter X" or Chapter X112 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act is "dim or non-existent". 18
The failing company doctrine has had a long but relatively un-
eventful judicial history characterized by prolonged silences punctu-
ated only infrequently by an opinion which serves to shed light on
the subject. Only once prior to the instant case has a Supreme Court
ruling turned on the doctrine.' 4 In that case a complaint was brought
by the Federal Trade Commission under the original section 7 of the
Clayton Act' 5 alleging that a violation of the Act had resulted from
5. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), formerly 38 Stat. 631 (1914).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
7. 15 u.s.c. § 2 (1890).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), formerly 38 Stat. 631 (1914).
9. See Low, The Failing Company Doctrine: An Illusive Economic Defense under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 35 FoRDHAm L. Rav. 425 (1966).
10. Citizen Publishing Company v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 927 (1969) at 931.
11. Chandler Act 11 U.S.C. § 501 et. seq.
12. Chandler Act 11 U.S.C. § 701 et. seq.
13. 89 S. Ct. at 931.
14. International Shoe Co. v. F.T.C., 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
15. As enacted in 1914, section 7 provided:
No corporation . . . shall acquire . . . stock or other share capital of another
corporation where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen
competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation
making the acquisition...
In 1950 section 7 was amended by the Cellar-Kefauver Act to its present form which
provides:
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the acquisition by International Shoe of the stock of the W. H. Mc-
Elwain Co., like International, a producer of men's shoes. After ex-
tended consideration of the amount of competition between the two
manufacturers the Court looked to the financial status of McElwain
for an alternative ground for its holding against the Government. It
was in this discussion that the first and fullest judicial statement of the
doctrine appeared:
In light of the case thus disclosed of a corporation with resources
so depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation so remote that it
faced the grave probability of a business failure with resulting
loss to its stockholders and injury to the communities where its
plants were operated, we hold that the purchase of its capital stock
by a competitor (there being no other prospective purchaser),
not with a purpose to lessen competition, but to facilitate the ac-
cumulated business of the purchaser and with the effect of mit-
igating seriously injurious consequences otherwise probable, is not
in contemplation of law prejudicial to the public and does not
substantially lessen competition or restrain commerce within the
intent of the Clayton Act.' 6
The doctrine thus enunciated had had its origins in the opinions
in two Sherman Act cases decided prior to International Shoe, one
delivered by the Supreme Court, 17 the other by the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit. 18 In the U. S. Steel litigation, decided by
the Supreme Court, the Government sought the dissolution of the
United States Steel Company on the grounds that practices surround-
ing its organization and its operating practices violated the Sherman
Act. In one portion of its opinion the Court was called upon to de-
termine whether U.S. Steel's acquisition of the Tennessee Coal and
Iron Company had been accompanied by the intent to monopolize
and, thus, was in violation of the provisions of the Act; the Court
found no monopolistic intent, recalling that the acquisition had been
sanctioned by President Theodore Roosevelt, that the property was
nearly worthless in the hands of the Tennessee Company because of
its financial straits and that, under such circumstances, public interest
would be served by allowing the Steel Company to take possession of
[N]o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital . . . of another corporation
engaged also in commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
16. 280 U.S. at 302, 303.
17. United States v. United States Steel, 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
18. American Press Association v. United States, 245 F. 91 (7th Cir. 1917).
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the property, thereby insuring its value and protecting the interests
of creditors and the local community' 9
American Press Association, like U.S. Steel, involved the Sherman
Act. The parties defendant to that litigation, American Press Asso-
ciation and Western Newspaper Union, had, in 1912, entered into a
consent agreement which forbade Western's acquisition of American.
In 1917, however, American petitioned for a modification of the de-
cree to allow its purchase by Western. The Circuit Court, in approv-
ing the petition, noted that due to World War I conditions were
depressed in the newspaper industry, that American's monthly losses
exceeded $3000 and that American's directors had determined to wind
up its business. Noting that "No one outside the business would be
likely to buy a demonstrated loss"'20 the court decided that public
interest and that of American's stockholders and creditors would both
be served by allowing Western to purchase American.
After 1930, the year of the International Shoe decision, the courts
had no further occasion to flesh out the skeletal doctrine which they
had developed and so it remained, until the flurry of anti-merger ac-
tivity which followed the 1950 amendment to the Clayton Act,21 a
judicial creation made up of parts (whether equal or not could not
be known) of depleted resources, remote prospects of rehabilitation,
grave probability of business failure, maximization of public welfare,
and, parenthetically, absence of alternate prospective purchasers. Mean-
while, the precise meaning of those parts which had become parts of
19. We may pause here for a moment to notice illustrations of the Government of
the Corporation, instancing its acquisition after its formation of control over the
Shelby Steel Tube Company, the Union Steel Company, and, subsequently the Ten-
nessee Company. There is dispute over the reasons for these acquisitions which we
shall not detail. There is, however, an important circumstance in connection with
that of the Tennessee Company which is worthy to be noted. It was submitted to
President Roosevelt and he gave it his approval. His approval, of course, did not
make it legal, but it gives assurance of legality, and we know from his earnestness
in the public welfare he could have approved of nothing that had even a tendency
to its detriment. And he testified he was not deceived and he believed that "the
Tennessee Coal and Iron people had a property which was almost worthless in their
hands, nearly worthless to them, nearly worthless to the communities in which it
was situated, and entirely worthless to any financial institution that had the securities
the minute that any panic came, and that the only way to give value to it was to put
it in the hands of people whose possession of it would be a guarantee that there was
value to it." Such being the emergency it seems like an extreme accusation to say
that the Corporation which relieved it, and, perhaps, rescued the company and the
communities dependent upon it from disaster, was urged by unworthy motives . ..
and it would seem a distempered view of purchase and result to regard them as
violations of the law.
251 U.S. at 446.
20. 245 F. at 93.
21. Supra note 16. J.
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the doctrine and their relative importance in the eyes of the Court
remained uncertain.
Passage of the Cellar-Kefauver Amendment to section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act in 1950 was accompanied by indications in both the House22
and the Senate23 of legislative intent to preserve the failing company
doctrine as a defense to anti-merger prosecutions. Nowhere in the
Congressional debates, however, was the intended scope of the defense
determined.24 With the quickening pace of anti-merger prosecutions
after 1950 courts were again confronted with cases in which it was
suggested that the doctrine should be applied. In 1962 any doubts
which had arisen concerning the continued viability of the defense
were apparently silenced. In the course of his opinion in the leading
case of Brown Shoe Co. v. United States25 Mr. Chief Justice Warren
had occasion to write,
supporters of the [1950] amendments indicated that it would not
impede, for example, a merger between .. . a corporation which
is financially healthy and a failing one which no longer can be a
vital competitive factor in the market.26
In further reference to the doctrine the Chief Justice said,
The importance which Congress attached to economic purpose
is further demonstrated by the Senate and House Reports on
H. R. 2734, which evince an intention to preserve the "failing
company" doctrine of International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 280 U. S. 291.27
Brown Shoe served notice that the Court was prepared to hear the
failing company defense; it gave no indication of how closely the doc-
trine would be limited to the International Shoe fact situation. In
particular, Brown Shoe gave no hint of the weight to be attached to
the parenthetical limitation regarding absence of alternative prospec-
tive purchasers which the Court included in its 1930 definition of the
doctrine.2 The vigor of this limitation had been at issue in United
States v. Diebold, Inc.,29 a per curiam decision remanding to the Dis-
trict Court which had entered a summary judgment against the
22. H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949).
23. S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. 7 (1950).
24. See Low, op. cit.
25. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
26. Id. at p. 319.
27. Id. at p. 331.
28. 280 U.S. at 302.
29. 369 U.S. 654 (1962).
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Goverment. The Court's basis for remanding was that the determina-
tion by the lower court in this anti-merger action that Diebold, the
acquiring firm, was the only bona fide prospective purchaser of the
allegedly failing company was not properly made in light of the con-
flicting inference which could be drawn from data upon which the
court based its decision to grant summary judgment and that, there-
fore, it was appropriate to have evidence presented on this issue.30
As the pivotal question in Diebold had been the relevance of the
"no alternative purchaser" requirement, that decision, although less
than a definitive statement by the Court, gave at least some support
to the belief that such a requirement would be enforced. However,
at least one commentator has expressed doubt as to the precedental
importance of Diebold as it was followed almost immediately by the
rather vague dicta in Brown in which there was no mention of the
requirement, especially in light of the existence of some evidence that
that imprecision had been intentional.8 1 It seems clear that any lin-
gering doubt on this point has now been removed by the decision in
Citizen Publishing. In the Court's view, if an alternative to the absorp-
tion of a firm by its competitor exists it must be utilized in order that
"a unit in the competitive system would be preserved and not lost to
monopoly power.13 2
The Brown Shoe discussion not only was mute regarding the alter-
native purchaser requirement, it also ignored the possibility that other
methods of saving a failing company might exist which would have
to be shown to have been exhausted before a lawful sale or merger
could be consummated. This possibility had been raised in Interna-
tional Shoe but the Court then rejected the establishment of such a
test of legality saying "but; as it seems to us, all of these [suggested
requirements] may be dismissed as lying wholly within the realm of
speculation."' 3 The alternatives to outright sale or merger which had
30. "In determining that the acquisition of the assets of Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe
Company was not a violation of § 7, the District Court acted upon its findings that
"H.H.M. was hopelessly insolvent and faced with imminent receivership" and that
"Diebold was the only bona fide prospective purchaser for H.H.M's business." The
latter finding represents at least in part the resolution of a head-on factual con-
troversy of whether other offers for H.H.M.'s assets or business were actually made. ...
The materials before the District Court having thus raised a genuine issue as to the
ultimate facts material to the rule of International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
it was improper for the District Court to decide the applicability of the rule on a
motion for summary judgment. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 56(c).
369 U.S. at 654.
31. Low, op. cit.
32. 89 S. Ct. at 931.
33. 280 U.S. at 301.
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been there suggested to the Court included borrowing from banks,
receivership and proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act. The Court
specifically objected to the receivership suggestion on the grounds
that the success or failure of the receivership could not be forecast:
the suggestion that bankruptcy proceedings be employed was rejected
as leaving the fate of the failing company in the hands of its preferred
stockholders.
After International Shoe no mention was made of the role, if any,
to be played by reorganization on bankruptcy proceedings in section
7 litigation until the instant decision was handed down. The high
Court now appears to have taken the position that success in reorga-
nization under the bankruptcy laws is sufficiently probable to invali-
date the objections which had been voiced in International Shoe and
that the failing company doctrine will only be honored upon a show-
ing by the party who seeks to invoke its protection that successful re-
organization is a remote possibility.
The theoretical justification for the failing company doctrine is to
be found in the belief that the passing of a firm in dire financial straits
into the hands of a competitor could be marked by little anti-competi-
tive effect8 4 and should not, therefore, be prohibited by the antitrust
laws. Maintaining the doctrine as an exception provides a solution to
several knotty problems which would inhere in following a policy of
unrelieved rigor in application of the Clayton Act. The desirability of
providing an exception which would enable the assets of the failing
firm to be transferred to a new owner as a productive unit, the reten-
tion of an exception to facilitate the transfer of ownership from the
hands of the sole proprietor whose desire is to be freed of his respon-
sibilities, and the interests of stockholders and creditors of the failing
company in avoiding anti-trust complications in attempting to realize
the "going concern" value of the failing company are all said to pro-
vide cogent reasons for the retention of a loophole in the coverage of
the anti-merger laws through which the failing company can pass.35 In
the main it can be said that the commentators have viewed their role
as calling for a search for the limits of the doctrine, a search for the
balance point where the private benefits of extending the reach of the
doctrine are outweighed by harm to the public interest. In this search,
facilitating the quick expansion of dominant firms, increasing the reve-
34. G.E. Hale and Rosemary D. Hale, Failing Firms and the Merger Provisions of the
Antitrust Laws, 52 KENTUCKY L.J. 597 (1962).
35. Derek C. Bok, Mergers and the Clayton Act, 74 HARV. L. REv. 226 (1960).
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nue producing facilities of dominant firms, forestalling of potential en-
try, acquisition of sales lists and competitive data by dominant firms,
and enhanced potential for vertical integration and market foreclosure
have been identified as elements harmful to the public interest which
must be weighed against the private benefits realized from application
of the doctrine.3 6
Notwithstanding differences among the writers as to its scope, the ex-
istence of the doctrine has remained a virtual article of faith, however,
at least one recent author has labelled the doctrine a myth,3 7 regarding
the adoption of the 1950 amendment to section 7 as a death knell.
Rather than announcing a "doctrine," the courts, in this analysis, have
decided a small group of cases without establishing any generally ap-
plicable standard and in their deliberations have applied Sherman Act
tests of public interest which are no longer relevant to Clayton Act de-
terminations.
Prior to 1950 Section 7 forbade mergers which had the effect of less-
ening competition between the merging parties. Since strict application
of the statute would have precluded all mergers between competitors,
the courts were compelled to apply the rule of reason when called upon
to pass judgment on such transactions.38 In 1950 the amendment to
section 7 changed the status of liability from the lessening of competi-
tion between competitors to one of lessening of competition in any sec-
tion of the country.39 This, it has been suggested, coupled with an in-
dication that Congress' purpose in amending the Clayton Act was to
eliminate the reliance on Sherman Act tests,40 means that Congress has
declared that there is to be no judicial modification, no application of
the rule of reason, to its prohibition against mergers which lessen com-
petition in any section of the country.
As pointed out in the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Stewart, the
Court in Citizen Publishing sets forth evidentiary requirements which
must be met by one invoking the failing company doctrine.41 In so do-
ing it does not directly comment upon the theoretical dispute as to the
dimensions of the doctrine nor does it pass upon the theory that the
36. Philip Sotiroff, Federal Antitrust Law-Mergers-An Updating of the "Failing
Company" Doctrine in the Amended Section 7 Setting.
37. Martin F. Connor III, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: The Failing Company Myth,
49 GEORGETOWN L.J. 84 (1960).
38. Id. at p. 94.
39. Supra note 15.
40. S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950).
41. 89 S. Ct. at 933.
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doctrine may be no more than a myth. The Court has, however, for
this case resolved the conflict between the Congressionally determined
public interest in preserving competition by the prevention of mergers
and the private interests of the parties to this merger in favor of the
public interest. It is submitted that while the Court has not formally
retreated from its contention that the failing company doctrine is a
Congressionally mandated exception to the rule against mergers, this
case, with all others decided by the Supreme Court in which the failing
company doctrine was determinative of the outcome, strongly indicates
that should the Court be placed in the position of having to define the
scope of the doctrine with precision, that definition will be of a class
which has no members.
Although it was the purpose of the Court to "confine the failing com-
pany doctrine to its present narrow scope, ' 42 Citizen Publishing, be-
cause of the new importance attached to efforts short of merger to save
the failing company, represents a considerable narrowing of the doc-
trine as it was announced in International Shoe.
James S. Curtin
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF A LESSOR OF PERSONAL PROPERTY-
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the lessor of a truck is
not liable to lessee's passenger for injuries which resulted from acts
of the lessee, and that Section 390 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts is not applicable.
Littles v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, 433 Pa. 72, 248 A.2d 837 (1969).
Plaintiff, a minor, brought an action for injuries suffered while a
passenger in a truck leased from defendant, Avis. The truck was
leased by one Kemp, who was driving at the time the plaintiff suf-
fered her injuries.
The truck was twenty-four feet long, eight feet wide, approximately
eleven feet high' and weighed eight tons. Kemp was asked by de-
fendant's agent if he had driven a truck before, and he stated he
42. Id. at 931.
1. There is some disagreement in the report as to the height of the truck. The majority
referred to a receipt which recited a height of twelve feet. 433 Pa. 72 at 74, 248 A.2d 837
at 838. The dissent stated the truck was eleven feet high. 433 Pa. at 76, 248 A.2d at 839.
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